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4. The politics of local 
government environmental 
evaluations
Assessing bureaucracy in post-Reformasi 
Indonesia
Abstract: This article argues that bureaucracy plays politics in Indonesia, not 
only during the electoral periods, but also in public service. Using the case 
of environmental evaluation in local government, where natural resources 
comprise most of the local economy, this article discusses the politics of 
bureaucracy in undergoing daily governing processes. The environment and 
natural resource businesses are two opposing fields. Environmental evaluation 
becomes a contentious area and is usually highly political. This article identi-
fies the bureaucracy’s politicisation in environmental evaluation as occuring 
in at least in two forms—in measurement and in project implementation. In 
terms of measurement, bureaucracy tends to use minimum standards, while in 
project implementation, there are some occasions where bureaucracy tends to 
sub-contract the work to the third party, usually NGOs, especially in relations 
to sensitive issues, so that it is politically safer for them, once the result is not 
as pleasing as expected. This article uses some cases in Central Kalimantan, 
East Kalimantan, Central Java, and Bangka Belitung, and applied case study 
as research approach. 
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Introduction
THIS ARTICLE discusses the politics of bureaucracy in the case of envi-ronmental evaluations in four provinces in Indonesia—Central Kalim-antan, East Kalimantan, Central Java, and Bangka Belitung. It is usually 
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seen that bureaucracy is commonly politicised by politician executives and po-
litical parties in order to pursue their political and economic interests through 
public policy. Bureaucracy is described merely as an instrument for achieving 
particular political purposes. In fact, bureaucracy is not static like a machine. 
Bureaucrats play politics and actively take part in shaping the face of public 
policy. 
In Indonesia, bureaucracy’s politicisation is inseparable from the country’s 
regimentation. During the Indonesian New Order, patron was centered in Su-
harto and bureaucracy in the country was made to totally serve Suharto’s inter-
est. Following the fall of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998, patronage 
became dispersed into local government, and local executive heads became the 
center of power. The introduction of decentralisation policy and direct elec-
tions in Indonesia since Reformasi era1 have brought consequences, not only on 
the strengthening of democracy, but also on the rise of the oligarchy (Diprose, 
McRae & Hadiz, 2019).  
Decentralisation, together with direct elections since the Reformasi era, 
however, are seen not only to strengthen democracy. They also have excesses in 
the rise of a new oligarchy. Decentralisation together with direct elections have 
created new ‘local kings’, which refer to the powerful figures as local govern-
ment heads, who became strongmen. Local leaders being chosen democratically 
through elections, but then misusing their power for personal interest has led 
the country into patrimonial democracy (Webber, 2006). As Webber (2006, p. 
411) argues, patrimonial democracy refers to the weak rule of law and state’s 
incapacity to govern in a country, despite the democratic election processes. 
Although elections are relatively democratic, governance runs slow, and is inter-
est and elite-biased (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1984; Haugaard, 2016). Bureaucracy is 
described merely as a tool for political elites to fulfill their personal interests. 
Bureaucracy, as such, is politicians’ object of power. 
This article, however, tries to reveal a different point of view. Using the case 
of environmental governance in regions rich with natural resources in Indonesia, 
this article reveals that bureaucrats also develop political strategies to either avoid 
career risks or pursue their own interests. Based on field research conducted in 
four natural resource rich regions in Indonesia between 2018 and 2019—East 
Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Java and Bangka Belitung—this ar-
ticle argues that in a situation where elite-driven politics feature most, the face 
of decision-making processes, bureaucracy also plays politics. Bureaucrats not 
only play politics during electoral periods by supporting particular candidates 
to secure their positions in government offices (Berenschot, 2018), but also in 
the daily making of public policy. The case of environmental evaluation in local 
governments sheds light clearly on how bureaucracy applies particular political 
approach in environmental governance. 
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Based on its research findings, this article argues that bureaucracy’s politi-
cisation in environmental evaluation occurs at least in two forms, namely in the 
measurement and in project implementation. In terms of measurement, bureau-
cracy tends to use minimum standards, while in project implementation, they 
tend to sub-contract the work to the third party, especially in relation to sensitive 
issues, so it is politically safer for them, once the result is not as pleasing as 
expected.  In natural resource-rich regions, where exploitation is rampant, and 
political structure is paternalistic, there is almost no room for bureaucracy, es-
pecially in the Environmental Office, to consistently comply with environmental 
standards set up by the national government. If they do so, then it means they 
risk their professional career, because the local government heads are in charge 
of the bureaucracy’s structure and promotion. 
Decentralisation and direct election era, as such, have forced bureaucracy 
not only to comply with administrative regimes, where daily businesses are 
made to fit with legal regulations, procedures, and mechanisms. This also has 
forced bureaucracy to make a deal with political regime, so that they have to 
move strategically in order to make sure their tasks accomplished, and their 
careers are safe. The case of environmental evaluations in natural resources-rich 
regions have let us know clearly how the politics of the bureaucracy runs in daily 
governance and policy making.
This article seeks to enrich the existing studies on the politics of the bureau-
cracy that have already had a devastating impact (see Moe, 1989; Peters, 2001; 
Meier & O’Toole Jr., 2006; Esmark, 2020). This article also tries to deepen the 
political sense of environmental evaluation, which is rarely explained from the 
framework of bureaucratic politics studies (see for instance Fruh at. al., 1976, 
Lazzari and Levizzari, 2000; Cheung & Leung, 2008; Shonensein, DeCelles, & 
Dutton, 2014; Lovebrand, Mobjork, & Soder, 2020). This article aims to gain 
a deeper meaning of the politics of bureaucracy by portraying the practices of 
environmental evaluations in Indonesian local government. 
Research methods
This article draws on empirical experiences in four different provinces in Central 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Bangka Belitung and Central Java. Except for 
Central Java, the provinces are known to rely economically on natural resources. 
Central Kalimantan is the centre of oil palm plantation. East Kalimantan is the 
centre of coal mining. Bangka Belitung is the source of tin. Yet, in Central Java, 
the regions where cement factories are established, as Pati and Rembang, ce-
ment industries also play crucial roles in local economy.  The research applied 
case study as an approach to elaborate the issue and use in-dept interviews and 
direct visit to collect data. There are 20 informants in Central Kalimantan, 12 in 
East Kalimantan, 11 in Bangka Belitung, and 30 in Central Java. The informants 
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consist of business actors in companies and community, regency government, 
provincial government, NGO activists, journalists and university academics. Di-
rect visits were conducted to palm oil plantation and mining areas, community 
cooperatives, government offices, media offices and NGO offices. In 2018, field 
work the location included Central Jawa Province, while in 2019 it included 
Bangka Belitung, East Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan.
Bureaucracy, politics, and environmental governance
The relationships between bureaucracy and politics have always been an inter-
esting topic to discuss. Peters (2001, p. 12) has highlighted that the politics of 
bureaucracy reveals the interconnectedness between bureaucracy, the public 
(citizen), and the (elected) governments in governing processes. In theory, what 
bureaucracy does is administrative, to operationalise decision making, administer 
it, and put everything into paper. The politics of bureaucracy tries to see bureau-
cracy as political actors more empirically in daily decision-making practices. As 
such, it does not see bureaucracy as merely as an object of power. Rather, it sees 
bureaucracy as another political actor that equally plays crucial roles in a room 
called policy making and governance, entailing some interest within (Pekonen, 
1985), and exerting influence on policy outcomes (Whitford, 2002, p. 167-168). 
Some studies have been done on the politics of bureaucracy, including in 
developing democracies. There are at least four main interrelating scopes that 
scholars discuss in the study of the politics of bureaucracy—the structure of bu-
reaucracy (Whitford, 2002; Moe, 1989; Rockman, 2001; Warburton, 2018), the 
(bureaucratic) processes—the administration (Meier, 1997; Peters, 2001; Spicer, 
2015; Jiang, 2018; Bartl, Papilloud & Terracher-Lipinski, 2019; Shidarta & van 
Huis, 2020), the modes of the politics of the bureaucracy (Wood &Waterman, 
1991; Wood and Waterman, 1993; Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 1998; Balla, 
1998; Furlong, 1998; Meier and O’Toole Jr., 2006; Rudalevige, 2009; Tanwir 
& Fennel, 2010; Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011; Naseemullah & Chhibber, 2018; 
& Chan, 2020), and the policy and political implications (Meier, 1997; Bucchi, 
2009; Rogers, 2019; Esmark, 2020). 
Environmental governance is a field where the politics of bureaucracy can 
be clearly seen, yet the studies revealing this are still not many. Environment is a 
contentious issue (Marantz & Ulibarri, 2019), moreover if it is related to natural 
resource (Edwards & Heiduk, 2015, Delabre & Okereke, 2019). It is contentious 
because it is prone to tension or conflict, sometimes it involves repression, and 
displacement, and its governance tends to be interest-based and elite-biased (Van 
Der Heijden, 2002). 
Yet, there are not many studies that see this contention as a depiction of bu-
reaucratic politics. In the Indonesian context, the contention gets more complex 
with the introduction of decentralisation policy and direct elections. The two 
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newly introduced policies have brought excesses on the strengthening of local 
oligarchy, of which actors can be usually related with business backgrounds, in-
cluding with natural resource businesses (Fukuoka, 2012; Tomsa, 2015; Aspinall 
& As’ad, 2016; Hidayaturrahman, Ngarawula, & Sadhana, 2020). 
Decentralisation and direct election bring together administrative and 
political regime to local governments, which later force bureaucracy to adapt 
and comply with the daily governing processes (Berenschot, 2018). As elected 
politicians in top executive positions determine bureaucratic appointment and 
promotions (Berenschot, 2018, p. 139), patronage and partisanship in bureaucracy 
becomes unavoidable (Demir, 2017, p. 157). This sometimes puts pressure on the 
bureaucracy, even tensions within (Konkipudi & Jacob, 2017, p. 10). In natural 
resource-rich regions, the pressure sometimes is heightened, given the multiple 
actors involved within, including those that come from the capital of Jakarta, the 
related provinces and the regency itself, as well as the huge resource accesses 
being contested. Yet, bureaucracy is not only politicszed, as Berenschot (2018) 
argues, they also take part in the game and play politics. 
Environmental policy, politics and bureaucracy: The case studies
Environmental evaluations in Indonesia are regulated through Law No. 32/2009, 
Government Decree No. 27/2012 and the Ministry of Environment’s regulation 
No. 16/2012. The laws identified key terms which relate to environmental evalu-
ations, including Strategic Environmental Studies (Kajian Lingkungan Hidup 
Strategis-KLHS), Environmental Impact Analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak 
Lingkungan Hidup-AMDAL), Environmental Quality Standard (Baku Mutu 
Lingkungan Hidup), Environmental Audit (Audit Lingkungan), and Environ-
mental Permit (Ijin Lingkungan). The terms can be referred as mechanisms to 
regulate development policies prior and following the policies are implemented. 
The definition of these terms according to the laws are as the following.
Strategic Environmental Studies is a series of systematic, comprehensive 
and participatory analysis conducted to make sure that sustainable development 
principles have been made as the basis of and integrated with development 
activities in particular regions and/or policies, planning, and/or programmes. 
Environmental Impact Analysis is a study on the important forecasted impacts 
of businesses and/or activities planned to be conducted on environment, which is 
used as a basis for decision making on the business and/or activities’ execution. 
Environmental Quality Standard refers to threshold or level of particular living 
things, substance, energy or component and/or polluter tolerable to bring impacts 
on environment. Environmental Audit refers to evaluation analysis on obedience 
of business and/or activities on laws and policies made by the governments. 
Environmental Permit refers to permit given to parties conducted business and/
or other activities, which are included in those obliged with the fulfillment of 
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Environmental Impact Analysis or Environmental Management-Environmental 
Control, as an effort to protect and manage environment. Environmental Permit 
is a requirement for those willing to gain business and/or activity permit. 
Strategic Environmental Studies, Environmental Impact Analysis, Environ-
mental Permits are types of environmental evaluations prior to a business and/
or activity to consider the impact on environment. Meanwhile, Environmental 
Audit is conducted during and following a business and/or activity operated and 
ended. The aims are clear. Environmental evaluation is meant to make sure that 
the business/activity is safe for the environment in the future. Environmental 
capacity is measured to see whether it is able to bear the forecasted impacts of 
the businesses and/or activities. Evaluation during and following the operation 
of a business/activity is meant to ensure that the level of environmental impacts 
of the businesses/activity still fit with the threshold set up by the government. As 
both environmental evaluations are crucial in development policy, are equally 
highly political (Ombudsmen of Republic of Indonesia, 2013), this article refers 
to both mechanisms in its analysis.
Although regulations have been clearly mentioned for environmental evalu-
ations, implementation in practice remains a problem. As Ombudsmen of the 
Republic of Indonesia’s investigation shows, all the problems originated from 
the involvement of consultants hired by companies to administer environmental 
permit (2013). The consultant merely functions as middlemen that links between 
companies and staffs in Environmental Office, including Local Environmental 
Governance Body (Badan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup Daerah-BPLHD). In 
some cases, environmental permit administrators in BPLHD forced companies to 
use only BPLHD’s partner consultant and turn over particular amount of money 
for getting the environmental recommendation released. Otherwise, permit admin-
istration would not be processed (Ombudsmen of Republic of Indonesia, 2013). 
The similar phenomena are found in the four cases being studied in this research.
Central Kalimantan
Central Kalimantan is one of the biggest palm oil producers in the world with 
16,000 km2 land coverage and 183 companies in 2019 (as reported by Tirto, 
2020). Common violations against environmental regulations found in Central 
Kalimantan, according to the findings of Environmental Investigation Agency 
and Telapak, Pusaka, and Save Our Borneo, the local NGOs in Central Kalim-
antan, is plantation without legal environmental permit. The case, which can 
be referred as an example, is Suryamas Cipta Persada (2012) (Environmental 
Investigation Agency, 2012),  Genting Plantation (2018) (Pusaka, 2018) and Sa-
lonok Ladang Mas (2019) (Save Our Borneo), the leading palm oil plantation 
companies in the region. Another violation relates to environmental quality 
standard, resulted from palm oil companies’ activities that polluted rivers in 
the province, as in the case of Sukajadi Sawit Mekar (Antara New, 2018) and 
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Mustika Sembuluh (2019) (Borneo News, 2019). However, as an environmental 
activist states in Central Kalimantan asserts, ‘Non-enforcement is a clear mode 
of politics. The government is aware of the violation, but Office of Environment 
does not impose its power to correct the wrong-doing’ (Environment activist, 
interview, July 2020).
In addition to non-enforcement, another form of politicking in environmental 
evaluation is the incompatibility between what is seen in the field and what is 
written in the report. An informant in a government office asserts, 
It sometime happens. We can see from the naked eyes that rivers’ water 
quality is degrading. The watercolor is not clear, but as written in the 
report the water quality index increases. Meanwhile, we can see clearly 
that concession for plantation in the region expands, forest and peatland 
fires still occur, air quality clearly worsened. Yet, written index told us its 
quality increases. (Government office informant)
As such, despite the long existing desks for regulating environmental issues, 
Offices of Environment in local governments is almost not functional. Decen-
tralisation and local direct elections become a crucial context to explain the 
dysfunctionality of environmental offices in resources-rich regions in Indone-
sia. An interview with a government officer in Central Kalimantan implies that 
things become more difficult because the (palm oil) companies’ owners get 
involved in practice politics, handle executive seats in local governments, and 
dominate the political decision making. Therefore, all the policies are oriented 
to support palm oil businesses. ‘If the local leaders come from palm oil compa-
ny, in decision making processes, they then become the men of the companies’ 
(Government officer, interview, October 2019). 
Finally, the politics of bureaucracy in environmental evaluations is manifest-
ed through the sub-contraction of an NGO to conduct the environmental assess-
ment. An informant, an environmental NGO activist in Central Kalimantan, says, 
I realise, [the] Office of Environment has some environmental laboratories. 
However, they still lack capacity. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is 
not rare to face pressure and intimidation, as experienced by the Office’s 
chief in an emission research project that tries to measure the impact of 
forest and peatland fires. Therefore, it is us, NGO, that support them to do 
their jobs. The government is weak, that they allow us, as a civil society 
organisation to get involved within. We [are] like as if we are doing a 
government’s job. (Interview, June 2019)
Sub-contracting NGO, therefore, can have positive implication on the one hand, 
but can also have the negative one on the other hand. By distributing assess-
ment job to NGO, at least, the bureaucrats in Office of Environment still has 
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awareness of the importance of monitoring the business impacts on environ-
ment. On the other hand, this, however, implies risk aversion, in which the bu-
reaucrats avoid any risks born by the assessment result, once it is not as pleased 
as expected. 
East Kalimantan
East Kalimantan is the largest producer of coal in Indonesia.  Until 2018, coal 
production capacity in East Kalimantan covered almost 60 percent of nation-
al coal production (Extractive Industries Transparency, 2020, Ardianto et. al, 
2019). Despite the ups and downs, in 2019, East Kalimantan produced 7.8 mil-
lion metric tons. East Kalimantan, however, is known not only as among the 
richest provinces in Indonesia. It is also known as among the most environmen-
tally destroyed regions. Mining in East Kalimantan has left highest number of 
pits in Indonesia—1735. 
As in Central Kalimantan, non-enforcement is applied to deal with environ-
mental complexities in East Kalimantan. As Toumbourou, Muhdar, Werner, and 
Bebbington (2020, p. 12) there is already Local Government Decree No. 8/2013, 
which opened up possibility for enacting law on reclamation and mining illegal-
ity. However, Mongabay investigation (2014) reveals law enforcement does not 
work. In addition, as #BersihkanIndonesia, a coalition of environmental NGOs, 
comprising Auriga, Green Peace, Indonesia Corruption Watch, JATAM (Jarin-
gan Anti Tambang or Anti-mining Network), Walhi (Indonesian Environmental 
Forum) and YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Assistance Foundation) (2020), asserts, 
the policy scheme launched later through Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal 
Mining, Government Decree No. 78/2010 on Reclamation and Post-Mining, the 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 26/2018 on Good 
Governance and Supervision of Mineral and Coal Mining Operations, and 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 7/2014 as amended 
by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 26/2018, to 
tackle the mining pits and reclamation issues does not touch the roots of the 
problem, namely mining illegality. Through the relation, the government of 
Indonesia means to oblige companies to deposit some fund to guarantee post-
mining responsibility. However, the #BersihkanIndoensia coalition asserts that 
the regulations are prone to corruption and potentially violated. 
In addition to non-enforcement, confirming the Ombudsmen’s finding, politics 
of bureaucracy in environmental evaluation in East Kalimantan is manifested 
through third-party sub-contracting, which relates to environmental permit. An 
ex-staff member in an environmental consultant company in East Kalimantan adds, 
‘The company drives the environmental consultant and assessment committee 
to approve their environmental permission proposal’ (Environmental consultant, 
interview, July 2019). This statement confirms WALHI (Wahana Lingkungan 
Hidup Indonesia or Indonesian Environmental Forum), an environmental NGO in 
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Central Kalimantan, that Ministry (and Offices) of Environment and Forestry are 
not more than a national government’s instrument to proceed their interest-based 
policy (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, 2020).
Another interesting practice of the politics of bureaucracy to see is the 
involvement of academicians in environmental project. An informant, who is 
an environmental activist in East Kalimantan asserts, ‘Environmental impact 
assessment, conducted by an environmental consultant often involves academi-
cians, some of them are professors, but as you may see, academicians are for 
legitimation’ (Environmental activist, interview, July 2020). In addition, data 
deletion is the most common practice in environmental evaluation. An informant, 
who is an environmental activist in East Kalimantan, said, ‘As an example, if 
the acid level in water is not acceptable by regulations in environmental impact 
assessment, then we do not present it in the document. Another way is to change 
the written number’ (Environmental activist, interview, July 2019).
Central Java
Central Java is among the most densely populated provinces in Indonesia, with 
the population density 1022 per km2 (2014). Its economy depends on trading 
and farming, yet there is potential for mining in some regencies. Oil and min-
eral mining are among natural resource-related activities in the provinces, with 
cement getting more important in shaping some regencies’ economies, includ-
ing Rembang, Pati, Blora, Grobogan, and Kebumen. Protest against cement 
mining has been massive, yet, the movement is often politically defeated, al-
though there is already a legal verdict ruling that the mining is illegal, as in the 
case of Kendeng Mountain, Rembang. 
Rather different from Central and East Kalimantan, environmental poli-
tics in Central Java is manifested in local government’s disobedience to the 
national government in its environmental policy. As Enggarani and Spaltani 
(2019) argue, the politics of disobedience is manifested through the disregard 
of the High Court’s decision on the environmental permit status of PT. Semen 
Indonesia, which is counted illegal, by changing the name and coverage of the 
company from PT. Semen Gresik to PT. Semen Indonesia, and from 5.2 to 2.93 
km2 [through Decision Letter No. 660.1/30, 2016 (Tirto, 2016). In addition, as 
Hadi, Purnaweni and Prabawani (2019) identify, the disobedience is also mani-
fested through the unwillingness of the Central Java Province and Pati regency 
government to incorporate the Strategic Environmental Assessment in their 
environmental permit policy on cement industries. 
Interestingly, the local bureaucrats also impose its politics in environmental 
policy by not completing environmental data, including environmental support 
and environmental capacity data, which are useful to refer to permit the new 
mining industry or not.  The institution does not have recorded annual notes on 
the quality of water, air and soil. All these issues confirm an informant, who has 
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a background as a civil society organisation activist, who says, ‘[The] Office of 
Environment or Office of Environment and Forestry is not helpful to preserve 
environment. They rather look [as if they are] the gate opener for extractive and 
plantation business expansions’ (Civil society activist, interview, August, 2020).
Bangka Belitung 
Bangka Belitung is used to be known as the biggest tin producer in the world. Cur-
rently, the production decreases, yet Bangka Belitung remains putting tin mining 
as the backbone of its economy, in addition to tourism. In 2018, Bangka Belitung 
produced 70,000 tons of tin ore (Ardianto, 2019), involving PT. Timah, Tbk, a 
state-owned company, as the main operator, which produced about 40 percent of 
tin, and the rest 60 percent is by private companies owned by foreign businessmen 
from China, India, Japan, and Taiwan (Ibrahim, Haryadi & Wahyudi, 2018; Stock-
lin-Weinberg, 2017; Ibrahim, Haryadi, & Wahyudi, 2018, p. 365) both offshore 
and onshore. Not only improving local wealth, tin mining is also seen to cause 
environmental destruction, in which offshore practice is seen to cause dangerous 
mining pits, while the onshore ones has led to seawater pollution. 
Referring to Haryadi (2015, p. 52), bureaucratic politics in tin mining in 
Bangka Belitung is manifested through the inconsistent enforcement of envi-
ronmental evaluations. In some occasions, the local government looks to strictly 
ban illegal mining operation, but in the other occasions they look to omit the 
practices. Similarly, in some mining areas, miners are arrested in the name of law 
enforcement, but in some other areas, miners are let to run their mining activities. 
On the one hand, inconsistent enforcement is political, because it implies the 
government’s motive to look as if they are committed for law enforcement. On 
the other hand, it leads to public distrust. Instead of resulting in positive impres-
sion from the public, inconsistency has led the perception that the government 
is unfair and selective (Ibrahim, Haryadi & Wahyudin, 2018, p. 375). 
In addition to inconsistent enforcement, another face of the bureaucratic poli-
tics in Bangka Belitung is also manifested in non-enforcement of environmental 
laws, especially in onshore-mining. Mongabay’s reportage in 2020 reveals, tin 
mining has been refused by fishermen in Bangka Belitung, for polluting rivers 
and sea water (Mongabay, 2020). However, the local government never shows 
its seriousness to ban the onshore-mining practices, or to make sure that the 
pollution threshold is in acceptable level. 
If traced further, all the problems of mining in Bangka Belitung rooted in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment that is not enacted strongly (Erwana, Dewi & 
Rahardyan, 2015). An informant in the region, who is an environmental activist 
said, ‘The environmental impact assessment is a copy paste from another region’ 
(Environmental activist, interview, September 2019). In addition, Environmental 
Impact Assessment documents issued by the Local Office of Environment only 
cover two suction vessels in South Bangka sea. Meanwhile, in that area, there 
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are dozens suction vessels operated to exploit tin. This implies that the assess-
ment is placed merely a formal requirement, rather than as a way to make sure 
that despite the mining business, there is a guarantee that environmental damage 
can be managed and reduced.
Not merely being politicised, bureaucracy also play politics
Empirical experiences from Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Central Java 
and Bangka Belitung have shown us that bureaucracy and politics is insepara-
ble. The inseparability is not only caused by the intense interference of politi-
cians and political parties in public policy, which need bureaucracy to set up the 
planning, budgeting, and implementation design. It also is caused by involve-
ment of bureaucracy in the political grounds in the policy making area. The 
political system that shifted from authoritarian regime to a more decentralised 
one in Indonesia has led some changes in the bureaucratic politics forms. If in 
the past bureaucracy was centered to only serve the Suharto’s regime in central 
government, in post-reformasi era, bureaucracy was shifted to serve the new 
local king born by direct local elections since 2005. Yet, due to the vast author-
ity of local government heads in managing local bureaucracy, as in terms of 
mutation and career promotion, bureaucracy started to play politics, not only to 
serve the executive politicians, to safe their careers, as well as to gain material 
benefits through corruption (Busse & Gröning, 2013, p. 18). 
Empirical findings in the four case studies confirm Peters (2001), Beren-
schot (2018), Demir (2017), and Konkipudi and Jacob’s argument (2017) that 
bureaucracy in the environmental sector is unable to avoid politicisation—an 
objectification of bureaucracy for supporting elite politicians’ interests. Yet, from 
the findings we can also see that bureaucracy is not merely being politicised. 
They also play politics. 
The politics of bureaucracy in environmental evaluations, both prior and 
following the natural resource-related business execution, based on research find-
ings collected from fieldworks in the four provinces, can be seen at least in three 
forms. The first is in terms of non-enforcement or inconsistent enforcement of 
environmental laws. The second is in terms of environmental data management. 
The third is in the sub-contraction of environmental project implementation. 
Non-enforcement is a common practice of politicking, which can be explained 
as a risk aversion mechanism of local bureaucracy on disciplining environmental 
impact threshold by the companies. As findings in Central Kalimantan, environ-
mental damage is hard to legally follow up because the local strongmen dominate 
the executive positions in the region, either in provincial or regency governments. 
Similarly, in East Kalimantan, coal mining is owned by a national politician, who 
has influence in national decision making. For local environmental bureaucrats, en-
acting environmental assessment will mean putting high risks on their bureaucratic 
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career in government office. Meanwhile, in Central Java and Bangka Belitung, 
the adherence of state-owned companies that operate the mining industries, make 
it difficult to regulate, because of the intimacy of the companies with executive 
politicians, as well as national political parties (Mietzner, 2007, p. 250). 
Environmental data is a sensitive thing. It shows us clearly whether the in-
stitution functions well or not, and, further to what extent the institution enjoys 
autonomy in doing their assigned tasks. Data is key to understand the politics of 
bureaucracy, as in many occasions, it can legitimise or delegitimise policies that 
has implication to wider public, like plantation permission, plantation impacts, 
mining legal status, and mining impacts. 
Meanwhile, environmental project sub-contraction, can have double implica-
tions. The first one is on the participation improvement of environmental policy 
implementation, in which non-government actors are allowed to participate in 
government-led environmental studies. However, on the other hand, this implies 
another risk aversion strategy. Environmental audit, for instance, requires high 
expertise on environmental studies. Environmental NGO usually has experts, 
which have ability to conduct such research. By involving experts from NGO, 
the local government can reduce the possibility of flaws in its analysis. 
The empirical practices of the politics of bureaucracy in environmental 
evaluations as highlighted above enrich the existing studies that bureaucracy is 
a political entity (Peters, 2001). Bureaucracy does not only become the object of 
politisation (Berenschot, 2018; Demir, 2017) but also takes part in the political 
game, which in this case is done by applying the politics of non-enforcement, 
data management and project sub-contracting. 
Conclusion
From the above discussion, bureaucracy is not merely a machine for politi-
cians to help them achieve their interests through policy making. Bureaucracy 
also plays politics, because bureaucrats also have their own interest in pub-
lic policy. The apparent interest of bureaucracy is related to career safety, as 
in terms of mutation and promotion. Another interest related to rent seeking, 
namely, to seek for material benefits from the policy the bureaucrats administer. 
Non-enforcement of environmental laws is the common mode of the politics of 
bureaucracy in environmental governance, followed with environmental data 
management that include data deletion and deliberate absence. Finally, envi-
ronmental project sub-contraction is the last mode of bureaucratic politics, con-
ducted though the devotion of environmental assessment to the third party, to 
avoid further risks, once assessment is conducted by the Office of Environment 
itself. The findings have shown bureaucracy is not merely an administrative 
body in the governmental institution. It needs to be seen as an active political 
actor, as well, in policy making. 
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Note
1. Reformasi refers to the changes in Indonesian politics that brought Indonesia out of 
authoritarian regime under Suharto’s admininstration into a new era, identified with a 
more decentralised governance, called Reformasi era, since 1998.
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